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jfk jr.: the truth behind the crash

by:HGB     2019-11-28
NTSB identification: a NYC99MA178 accident occurred on July-16-
Malaysia Airlines: Piper PA-Vineyard paradise 9932R-
301. Registration: N9253N injury: 3 deaths.
Non-musical instruments-
Cross weather forecast obtained by pilot
National flights showing visible flight rules (VFR)
The sky is clear and the conditions of wide vision change between 4 and 10 miles along his scheduled route.
Then the pilot left on a dark night.
According to the performance study of radar data, the aircraft flew on land at a speed of 5,500 feet kilometers.
About 34 miles west of Martha\'s Vineyard Airport, through a 30-
A mile-long water reaches its destination, and the plane begins to drop by 400 to 800 feet per minute (fpm).
The plane turned right about seven miles from the coast.
The plane stopped dropping at 2,200 feet, then climbed back to 2,600 feet and went to the left.
At the turn of the left, the plane started another drop, down to about 900 fpm.
While the plane is still falling, turn right.
During this turn, the aircraft\'s descent speed and flight speed have increased.
The plane eventually dropped more than 4,700 fpm and the plane hit the water. down attitude.
It is reported that airports in coastal areas can be reached between 5 and 8 miles.
On the night of the accident, other pilots flying similar routes reported that they did not see the horizon while flying on the water due to smog.
The pilot estimated a total flight time of approximately 310 hours, of which 55 hours were spent at night.
The pilot\'s estimated flight time on the accident plane is about 36 hours, of which about 9 hours.
Four hours at night.
No certified flight instructor for about 3 hours (CFI)
On board, about 0.
The flight took eight hours at night, including landing at night.
In the 15 months leading up to the accident, the pilot had traveled about 35 times to his destination.
The pilot flew at least 17 of these legs without the CFI, 5 of which were at night.
Within 100 days prior to the accident, the pilot had completed approximately 50% of the formal instrument training sessions.
A notice of consultation by the Federal Aviation Administration (AC)61-
27C, \"instrument flight: dealing with the illusion in flight,\" pointing out that an illusion or false impression occurs when the information provided by the sensory organ is misunderstood or inadequate, many of the illusions in the flight can be met by complex movements and nights in bad weather conditions.
The AC also noted that some illusions may lead to a disorientation of space or the inability to accurately determine the attitude or movement of the aircraft relative to the surface of the Earth.
AC also noted that as VFR continues to fly to harsh weather conditions, space disorientation is often close to the top of the list of causes/factors in the annual statistics of fatal aircraft accidents.
According to AC 60-
\"The pilot\'s space is lost,\" tests performed on qualified instrument pilots suggest that after the Earth\'s surface loses its visual reference, the instrument may take up to 35 seconds to establish full control. AC 60-
4A further states that even if visibility may be higher than the VFR minimum, surface reference and natural horizon may become blurred, and that it is common, at night, to be unable to perceive the natural horizon or surface reference during water flight, in the sparsely populated areas, in the low
Visibility conditions.
The inspection of the fuselage, system, avionics and engine did not find any evidence of mechanical failure before impact.
It may cause the pilot to fail to maintain control of the aircraft when the water drops at night, which is the result of the loss of space.
The factors of the accident are smog and night.
Complete Narrative: on July 16, 1999, about 2141 Eastern summer time, a Piper --32R-
301, Saratoga II, N9253N, destroyed when it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, about 1/2 miles southwest of the Gay Head of Massa vineyard.
The certified private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured.
Visible meteorological conditions at night (VMC)
Prevailed and did not submit flight plans for individual flights under the provisions of 14 federal regulations (CFR)Part 91.
Flights from Essex airport (CDW)
Located in Caldwell, New Jersey, the destination is stable city of Bahn
Multiple courses in Poland (HYA)
In Hyannis, Massachusetts, Martha\'s Vineyard Airport (MVY)
Vineyard paradise in Massachusetts
In the interview, witnesses said the purpose of the flight was to fly to Martha\'s Vineyard, get a passenger off the bus, and then proceed to Haia.
A fixed employeebase operator (FBO)
At CDW, he called the pilot about 1300 on the day of the accident to verify the pilot\'s intention to fly the N9253N aircraft over the weekend.
The pilot told the employee that he did plan to fly the plane and that he would arrive at the airport between 1730 and 1800.
The employee told the pilot that he would park the plane outside the hangar.
Witnesses at CDW on the night of the accident said they saw pilots and a woman near the plane.
Witnesses also reported that they saw the pilot carrying his luggage into the plane with crutches.
A witness said he watched the pilot run the engine-
Then take off about 2040.
The witness further stated, \"it seems that the takeoff and the right downwind departure are [ed]normal.
According to air traffic control (ATC)
The transcript of the CDW Tower, about 2034, the pilot of the N9253N contacted the ground controller and said, \". . .
On November, Saratoga Nina was ready to take a taxi with Mike. . .
North East to the right.
\"The ground controller instructed the pilot to slide to runway 22, which the pilot admitted.
At 2038: 32, the pilot of the N9253N contacted the tower controller to inform him that he was ready to take off from runway 22.
At 2038: 39, the tower controller clears N9253N for takeoff;
At 2038: 43, the pilot admitted the permission.
A few seconds later, the tower controller asked the pilot if he was heading to tetrob, New Jersey.
The pilot replied, \"No, sir, I\'m actually going a little north and east.
The tower controller then directs the pilot to \"then let it take off correctly in the downwind direction \".
\"At 2038: 56, the pilot acknowledged the instruction, saying that\" the right wind set out twice.
\"There is no record of any further communication between the pilot and ATC.
According to radar data, at 2040: 59, the target of the visual flight rule is launched (VFR)
About a mile southwest of CDW, code was observed at an altitude of 1,300 feet metres.
The target continues to move to the northeast in a range of about 55 degrees, keeping it below 2,000 feet.
When it reaches the Hudson River, the target is 1,400 feet.
When the target is about 8 miles northwest of Westchester County Airport (HPN)
On the White Plains of New York, it crossed the river north and began to climb.
After moving about six miles north, the target turned to the east about 100 degrees.
The Target continued to climb, reaching 5,500 feet kilometers six miles northeast of HPN.
When the route of the target is drawn on the VFR navigation map in New York, the extended route runs through Martha\'s Vineyard island.
The target continues 5,500 feet kilometers east, north of Bridgeport, Connecticut, and through the coastline between Bridgeport and New Haven, Connecticut.
The target ground track is 100-
Degree courses located parallel to the coast of Connecticut and Rhode Island.
After Zhu Disi, Rhode Island, the Target continued to cross the Strait of Rhode Island.
Performance Studies of radar data show that the target is down 5,500 feet from about 34 miles west of MVY.
The speed in the descent process is calculated to indicate the wind speed at approximately 160 knots (KIAS)
, The drop rate is calculated to vary between 400 and 800 feet per minute (fpm).
About 2138, the target starts to turn right in the south direction.
After about 30 seconds, the target stopped dropping at 2,200 feet and started climbing for 30 seconds.
During this time, the target stopped turning and the wind speed dropped to about 153 KIAS.
About 2139, the Target stabilized at 2,500 feet and flew in the southeast.
After about 50 seconds, the target went to the left and climbed to 2,600 feet.
As the target continues to move forward on the left turn, it starts to drop, reaching a speed of about 900 fpm.
It stops turning when the target is East;
The drop rate remained around 900 fpm.
At 2140: 15, the target enters right when the target is still falling.
With the increase of the target turning speed, the decline speed and speed will also increase.
The target\'s rate of decline finally exceeded 4,700 fpm.
The last radar position of the target is 2140 at 1,100 feet m above sea level. (
More detailed description of the target [
Accident plane
For performance, see the section \"testing and research\", section \"aircraft performance Research. \")
July 20, 1999 about 2240 aircraft wreckage is located in target finally a record of radar location north of about 120 feet miles of 1/4 mi/.
The accident happened in the dark hours.
In the area where the accident occurred and that night, the sunset time was about 2014.
The civil twilight ended by about 2047, and the nautical twilight ended by about 2128.
About 2140, the moon is about 11.
5 degrees above the horizon, with a Orientation of 270.
5 degrees, providing about 19% of lighting.
The location of the wreckage was about 41 degrees, 17 minutes, 37.
2 seconds north latitude;
70 degrees 58 minutes 39
Western longitude 2 seconds
The pilot got his private pilot certificate.
The engine landed on April 1998 \".
He has no instrument rating.
He received the sign of a \"high-performance aircraft --
Took off on June 1998 in his Cessna 182 and the \"complex aircraft\" sign
Took off on an accident plane on May 1999.
His latest FAAFAA)second-
The class medical certificate was issued in December 27, 1997 without any restrictions.
A copy of the pilot log covering October 4-19, 1982 to November 11 was provided to the safety committee.
The pilot\'s recent log was not found.
The Commission estimates the pilot\'s total flight experience using a replicated log, a record of the training facility, a copy of the flight instructor\'s log, and statements from faculty and pilots.
In addition to simulation training, the pilot estimated a total flight experience of about 310 hours, of which 55 hours were in the evening.
Pilot\'s estimated experience in flying without a certified flight instructor (CFI)
About 72 hours on board.
The pilot\'s estimated flight time on the accident plane is about 36 hours, of which 9 hours.
Four hours at night.
There is no CFI for about 3 hours of flight time, about 0 hours.
Eight of them were flying at night, including landing at night.
During the 15 months prior to the accident, the pilot drove about 35 flying legs to and from the Essex County/tterborough area, New Jersey, and the Massa vineyard/Hyannis area.
The pilot flew 17 legs without the CFI on board, including at least 5 nights.
The pilot\'s last flight on an accident plane without the CFI was on May 28, 1999.
Pilot training in October 4, 1982, the pilot began to receive flight instructions.
For the next six years, he flew with six different CFIs.
During this period, the pilot recorded 47 hours, including 46 hours of dual instruction and no CFI on board for 1 hour.
From September 1988 to December 1997, the pilot did not have any entries in his log.
On December 1997, the pilot participated in the international flight safety training program (FSI)
Get his private pilot certificate at Vero Beach, Florida.
From December 1997 to April 1998, the pilot flew for about 53 hours, 43 of which carried the CFI.
The CFI who prepared the pilot for the private pilot check ride said the pilot\'s flying skills were \"very good\" because of his level of experience.
In April 22, 1998, the pilot passed his private pilot flight test.
The designated Pilot Examiner in charge of the inspection said that as part of the flight test, the pilot carried out two unusual attitude reverts.
The Pilot Examiner said that in both cases, the pilot was wearing the hood, referring to the aircraft\'s flight instrument and taking back the aircraft.
After receiving his private pilot certificate, the pilot flew his Cessna 182 solo and received instructions from the local CFIs in New Jersey.
He also received guidance at Million Air, a flight school in New Jersey, and flew their planes.
On 1998, the pilot flew about 179 hours, including about 65 hours without the CFI.
On March 12, 1999, the pilot completed a written test of the FAA\'s aircraft instrument with a test score of 78% points.
On April 5, 1999, the pilot returned to FSI to start the aircraft instrument rating course.
During the instrument training, the pilot successfully completed the first 12 of the 25 lesson plans.
The pilot\'s main CFI during the instrument training stated that the pilot\'s progress was normal and that he had all the basic skills needed to complete the course;
However, the CFI did recall pilots who were difficult to complete lesson 11, which was designed to develop students\' knowledge of the full range of very high frequency radio (VOR)
And non-directional beacon operation when working with ATC.
It took the pilot four times to complete 11 lessons successfully.
After two attempts, the pilot took 1-week break.
After the break, the pilot repeated 11 lessons twice.
The CFI said the pilot\'s basic instrument flight skills and simulator work very well.
However, the CFI stated that it was difficult for the pilot to manage multiple tasks while flying, which he thought was normal for the pilot\'s level of experience.
Pilots attend training mainly on weekends.
During the training period, a total of 13 pilot people.
CFI is available on board and the flight time is 3 hours.
In addition, the pilot recorded 16.
Simulator time 9 hours.
The pilot left FSI for the last time on April 24, 1999.
The pilot continues to receive flight instructions from CFIs, New Jersey, in his newly purchased accident plane Piper Saratoga.
A cfi flew with the pilot three times.
One of the flights was from CDW to MVY on June 25, 1999.
The CFI stated that the departure, en route and descent portion of the flight was performed in VMC, but due to the 300-
A cloudy ceiling under your feet.
CFI requires the formulation of instrument flight rules (IFR)
Clearance and demonstration of the coupling instrument landing system (ILS)
Close to runway 24
CFI said the pilot had landed but had to assist with the rudder due to an ankle injury to the pilot. (
For additional information about a pilot\'s ankle injury, see the section \"medical and pathological information. \")
CFI said that the pilot\'s aviation ability and the ability to handle multiple tasks while flying were average for his level of experience.
From May 1998 to July 1999, the second CFI flew with the pilot.
The CFI and the pilot have a total flight time of 39 hours, including 21 hours and 0 hours at night.
9 hours of flight under meteorological conditions (IMC).
The pilot uses this CFI for cross-instruction
National flights and safety pilots.
On July 1, 1999, CFI flew to MVY with the pilot on the accident plane.
The plane was in the evening and IMC got the upper hand at the airport.
The CFI said that during the flight, the pilot used the autopilot and seemed to have the ability to use the autopilot.
The instructor added that during the flight a non-gypsum casting was worn on the pilot\'s leg, which required the CFI to fly the aircraft and assist the pilot to land.
The CFI stated that the pilot has the ability to fly a plane without a visible horizon, but in this case it may be difficult to perform additional tasks.
He also said that as of July 1, 1999, the pilot was not ready for an instrument assessment and additional training was required.
The CFI did not know that the pilot carried out any flight on the accident plane without a coach.
He also said that he would not be comfortable with the accident pilot performing night flight operations on a route similar to the flight route, in weather conditions similar to the flight route, the night of the accident
CFI further stated that he spoke to the pilot on the day of the accident and offered to fly with him during the accident flight.
He said the pilot of the accident replied, \"he wants to do it alone.
\"From May 1998 to July 1999, the third CFI flew with the pilot.
Together with the pilot, the CFI accumulated 57 hours of flight time, including 17 hours of night flight and 8 hours of IMC flight.
The pilot also used the coach for cross-guidance.
National flights and safety pilots.
The CFI conducted a \"complex aircraft\" assessment of the pilot and signed him on the plane of the accident on May 1999.
According to the CFI, in one or two cases, the autopilot of the aircraft turned to a course other than the selected course, which required the autopilot to be detached and then reengaged.
It seems like the autopilot has changed from one navigation mode to another independently, he said.
He also said that he did not think the issue was important because it only happened once or twice.
CFI has six or seven flights to MVY with pilots in the accident plane.
The CFI said that most of the flights were carried out at night and that during the flight there was no problem with the pilot flying the plane.
The coach said the pilot was methodical about his flight plan and he was very cautious about his aviation decision --making.
The CFI said that as long as there is a visible horizon, the pilot has the ability to fly to MVY at night.
Aircraft information accident aircraft N9253N is a Piper32R-
301, Saratoga II, single roomengine, low-
Wing aircraft with retractable landing gear.
The aircraft was originally certified by Piper aircraft in June 9, 1995.
The plane was sold to Skytech.
Baltimore, Maryland, June 16, 1995, then resold to point ciana LLC, Wilmington, North Carolina, on January 5, 1996.
A review of the records of the engine overhaul facility shows that at 100-
On May 1998, the aircraft was inspected for hours and annually and corrosion was observed on the inner surface of the engine cylinder wall.
In addition, a twist point is observed on the surface of several valve tappets.
At that time, the engine had a total time from the new 387. 1 hours.
The documents also show that on June 1998, the engine was transported to the overhaul facility where the engine was disassembled, inspected and reassembled (
Replace parts if necessary)
June and July 1998
The engine was also operating in a test unit before leaving the factory and reinstalled on the aircraft on July 1998.
On August 25, 1998, the aircraft was purchased by Raytheon Aircraft in Wichita, Kansas, and then resold to the airline on the same day
Fairfield in New Jersey
The plane was sold to a pilot in New Jersey in August 27, 1998.
On April 28, 1999, the aircraft was sold to Columbia Aircraft Sales Co. , Ltd.
Groton, Connecticut
On the same day, the plane was sold to the airline and then to the accident pilot to operate as a random venture capital company
New York, New York.
According to CDW maintenance personnel, the pilot kept the maintenance records of the aircraft inside the aircraft.
No maintenance records were found in the debris recovery operation.
According to the FAA\'s records, work orders and maintenance facilities staff\'s statement, pre-order inspections were conducted on the N9253N on April 16, 1999.
According to the maintenance facilities staff, \"it was found that the aircraft was in very good condition, with only a few small differences.
\"According to the records and maintenance facilities staff, the annual inspection was completed in June 18, 1999, with a total body Time of 622.
Eight hours, the plane returned on June 25, 1999.
Record and maintenance facilities staff also revealed that the return of the aircraft was delayed due to errors on the aircraft registration form regarding its exact model and model.
A new registration form with the correct information must be sent to the pilot for his signature.
A on July 13, 1999, the work order shows the \"swing\" of the compass and the horizontal condition indicator \"(HSI)were completed.
The total time of the fuselage is not recorded on the work order.
The tachometer found in the wreckage shows 663. 5 hours.
A review of the other pilot logs showed that they were flying without an accident pilot boarding the plane.
However, it is not possible to accurately determine how many other pilots have flown without the pilot boarding the plane, or how many flight hours they may have added to the plane.
Meteorological information of the following Airport designated personnel (
And what was previously defined.
Use in this section: ACK-
Nantarket Memorial Airport in nantarket, Massachusetts. BDR -Igor I.
Econo Lodge Memorial Airport in Bridgeport, Connecticut. BID -
Rhode Island, Rhode Island, Burdock State Airport. BLM -
Bellmar airell Airport-
Farmington, New JerseyEWB -
New Bedford Airport, New Bedford, Massachusetts. EWR -
Newark International Airport, New Jersey. FMH -
Falangb, Falmouth, Massachusetts. FOK -Francis S.
New York airport at Westham beach. FRG -
Republic Airport, New York. ISP -
MacArthur Airport, Long Island, Islip, New York. JFK -John F.
JFK International Airport, New York. PVD -
Theodore Francis Green State Airport in Providence, Rhode Island. TAN -
Tautton city, tautton, Massachusetts. TEB -
Terboro Airport, terboro, New Jersey.
About 27 nautical miles (nm)east-
Southeast MVY.
HYA is located in the northeast of monthly nano MVY.
According to the pre-flight weather request of the pilots of the International Meteorological Service Organization (WSI)
In searching their briefing logs, the personnel said that the pilot or the person using his user code sent out two weather requests from WSI\'s Pilot Briefing website on July 16, 1999.
The first request made at 1832: 59 was the radar image.
The second request was made at 1834: 18 with MVY as an alternative to the route briefing from TEB to HYA.
The information provided to the requester includes route weather observations from BID, BLM, EWB, EWR, FMH, FOK, FRG, ISP, JFK, cvd, and TAN.
These observations show that the visibility of CDW ranges from 10 miles to 4 miles along the way.
It is reported that the lowest cloud top is 20,000 feet cloudy.
About 1800 observations were made.
Observations of ACK, CDW, HYA and MVY were also included.
Excerpts from these observations include the following: ACK 1753. . . Clear skies;
5 miles of visibility in fog;
The wind is 240 degrees at 16 knots. CDW 1753. . . Clear skies;
4 miles of visibility in smog;
With 7 winds of 230 degrees. HYA 1756. . .
There are very few clouds in 7,000 feet;
6 miles of visibility in smog;
Section 13 230 degrees. MVY 1753. . . Clear skies;
6 miles of visibility in smog;
11 wind 210 degrees.
Also includes the following terminal predictions for ACK and HYA: ACK (
1400 from July 16 to 1400 from July 17). . . July 16. . . 1400 to 2000. . . Clear skies;
Visibility is greater than 6 miles;
Wind force 240 degrees at 15 knots.
Become 2000 to 2100,13 wind 260 degrees. HYA (
1400 from July 16 to 1400 from July 17). . . July 16. . . 1400 to 2200. . . Clear skies;
Visibility is greater than 6 miles;
Wind force 230 degrees at 10 knots.
According to WSI, the pilot or the person using his user code did not visit the National Weather Service (NWS)Area Forecast.
Aviation Forecast and ground weather observation area Forecast (FA)
The extract released by the Boston Football Association on July 16 is about 2045, valid until about 0200 on July 17, including the following: coastal waters (
Including District MVY);
Scattered clouds 2,000 feet metres away.
There are occasionally 3 to 5 miles of visibility in the smog.
Smog is up to 7,000 feet.
The extract released by the Boston Football Association on July 16 is about 2045, valid until about 0900 on July 17, including the following: coastal waters (
Including District MVY);
40 degrees north latitude. . .
Scattered clouds
There are occasionally 4 to 5 miles of visibility in the smog.
Smog is up to 8,000 feet.
Aviation terminal forecast (TAF)
NWS does not prepare TAFs for MVY.
And accident related of TAFs extract including the following content: July 16 release of ack taf about for 1330,7 month 16 Wednesdays and Sundays for 1400 to July 17 about for 1400 content are as follows: on July 16, it was 1100 on the 17 th of 1400,7 months. . . Clear skies;
Visibility is greater than 6 miles;
Wind force 240 degrees at 15 knots.
July 16 in 2000 to July 16 in 2100 wind 260 degree in 13 section.
In TAF of ACK issue of July 16 July 17 July 16 about 2000 to about 1930 effective of about 2000 text are as follows: July 16 2000 in July 17 in 0200. . .
15 wind 240 degrees;
4 miles of visibility, fog;
Scattered clouds 25,000 feet metres away.
The provisional change from July 16-7 to 17 was 2100 per cent, or 0100 per cent. . .
The cloud is 500 feet scattered;
Visibility 2 miles, fog.
The tataf, which was released in July 16, was approximately £ 1330, from approximately £ 1400 in July 16 to approximately £ 1400 in July 17, valid from £ 1400 in July 16 to £ 1100 in July 17. . . Clear skies;
Visibility is greater than 6 miles;
Wind force 230 degrees at 10 knots.
The wind reached 2200 in July 16 and 0000 in July 17. . .
Section 8 250 degrees.
The tataf, which was released in July 16, was approximately £ 1930, from approximately £ 2000 in July 16 to approximately £ 2000 in July 17, valid from £ 2000 in July 16 to £ 0200 in July 17. . .
10 wind 230 degrees;
6 miles of visibility, smog;
Scattered clouds 9,000 feet metres away.
The provisional change from July 16-7 to 17 was 2000 per cent, or 0000 per cent. . .
Visibility 4 miles, smog. In-
There is no meteorological information of the pilot, important meteorological information (SIGMET)
Or the convection signal was issued by the NWS Aviation Weather Center in Kansas City, Missouri, for the time and area of the accident. No in-
From 2000 to 2200, there is a flight weather notice on the route between CDW and MVY.
MVY has an automatic ground observation system (ASOS)
, Edited and enhanced by ATC tower personnel if necessary.
MVY\'s Tower manager was on duty on the night of the accident for 8-
When the tower is closed, the shift of about 2200 hours is over.
In an interview, manager Tower said no action was taken to add or edit ASOS during his shift.
He also said: \"The visibility, current weather and sky conditions at the time of the accident may be a little better than reported.
The reason I say this is because I remember the plane visually approaching saying that they could see the airport 10 to 12 miles away.
I remember being able to see those planes, and I remember seeing the stars that night. . .
As far as I know, ASOS is working on the ad that day, with no reported issues or system log errors.
\"ASOS observations on the night of the accident included the following: ACK 2053. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
4 miles of visibility, fog;
11 wind 240 degrees;
Temperature 21 degrees]Celsius]C;
Dew point of 20 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 10 inches of [mercury]Hg. 2153. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
4 miles of visibility, fog;
12 winds of 240 degrees;
Temperature 21 ℃;
Dew point of 20 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 11 inch of mercury. BDR 2054. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
8 miles of visibility, smog;
The wind force is 230 degrees at 4 knots;
Temperature 27 ℃;
Dew point of 21 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 08 inch of mercury. CDW 1953. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
4 miles of visibility, smog;
The wind force is 230 degrees at 4 knots;
Temperature 33 ℃;
Dew point of 18 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 07 inch of mercury. 2053. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
5 miles of visibility, smog;
5 winds of 220 degrees;
Temperature 31 °c;
19 degrees below zero dew;
The height meter is set at 30. 08 inch of mercury. HPN 2045. . .
7,500 feet broken, 15,000 feet overcast, visibility 5 miles haze;
The wind force is 140 degrees at 4 knots;
Temperature 28 ℃;
Dew point of 22 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 08 inch of mercury. HYA 2056. . .
There are very few clouds in 7,000 feet;
6 miles of visibility, fog;
Wind force 230 degrees at 7 knots;
Temperature 23 ℃;
Dew point of 21 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 07 inch of mercury. 2156. . .
There are very few clouds in 7,500 feet;
6 miles of visibility, fog;
8 wind 230 degrees;
Temperature 23 ℃;
Dew point of 22 ℃;
The height meter is set at 30. 08 inch of mercury. MVY 2053. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
8 miles of visibility;
Wind force 250 degrees at 7 knots;
Temperature 23 ℃;
19 degrees below zero dew; altimeter 30. 09 inch of mercury. 2153. . .
Clear below 12,000 feet;
10 miles of visibility;
10 winds of 240 degrees, 15 gusts;
Temperature 24 ℃;
Dew point of 18 ℃; altimeter 30. 10 inch of mercury. U. S.
Coast Guard (USCG)
The weather observation safety board staff reviewed the weather observation at the US Coast Guard station.
Excerpts related to the accident include the following: 1700 Judith, Rhode Island. . .
Cloudy, 3 miles of visibility, south wind-
10 Southwest. 2000. . .
Cloudy, 3 miles of visibility, south wind-
10 Southwest. 2300. . .
Cloudy, 2 miles of visibility, 10 winds in the southwest.
Brant Point, Massachusetts 1700. .
8 miles of visibility. 2000. . .
6 miles of visibility. 2300. . .
Clouds are scattered and visibility is 6 miles.
Brant Point reported that the vessel reported two observations.
About 2000 kilometres, a ship was 1 nautical mile north of the 17 th buoy, about 8 miles north of Martha\'s Vineyard island, and reported 2 to 3 feet kilometres of ocean and 5 nautical miles of visibility.
About 2300, another ship reported that the wind was west-
In the southwest direction of 10 to 15 knots, the sea surface is 2 to 3 feet and the visibility is 6 nm in mild smoke.
Three pilots flying over the Long Island Strait the night of the accident were interviewed after the accident.
A pilot parked his twin-turbo spiral aircraft at TEB, who flew from TEB to ACK the night of the accident.
The pilot said he drove to TEB from New York City and the traffic was the second most crowded he had seen in 15 years.
The pilot said he had called teb fbo and estimated his arrival time to be around 1850;
However, he did not arrive until about 1930 to 2000 due to traffic.
The pilot also said the delay changed the flight from fully executed during the day to partially executed at night.
The pilot also said: \"Our car is from Highway 80 to tetrobo airport.
Where is Caldwell Airport:
Accident pilot
Pass TEB from Highway 80 and travel west for another 14 minutes.
\"Before leaving the city, the pilot had already received weather forecasts for the current South Tower kit and elsewhere in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.
Visibility is much higher than the VFR minimum, he said.
He also said that he called the flight service station (FSS)
Leave the city before driving to TEB.
On the phone, he said: \"I asked if there were any adverse conditions for TEB\'s route to ACK.
I was strongly told: \"There are no adverse conditions.
Have a good weekend.
I asked briefer about any expected fog and was told that there was no expected fog and the situation would maintain good visibility.
I feel relieved again that tonight is not a problem.
\"The pilot said he left TEB \". . .
Good flight conditions and reasonable visibility during the day.
The horizon was not covered by haze.
I can easily choose our land mark with at least five [miles]away.
\"The pilot also said that he did not request or receive flight information after leaving TEB.
He said that as soon as he left New York\'s B-class airspace, he climbed 17,500 feet metres into the plane and headed for Nantucket.
He reported that visibility was not restricted at more than 14,000 feet m;
However, he also reported that during his descent to nantarket, when his global positioning system (GPS)
The receiver said he was on the side of Martha\'s Vineyard and he looked down. . .
There\'s nothing to see.
No horizon, no light. . . .
I turned left to Martha\'s Vineyard to see if it was visible, but could not see any light or any evidence on the island. . .
I think this island may behave]
There was a power outage.
\"He said he turned on the flash during the descent and they never lit up the clouds or fog.
He also said, \"I don\'t have any kind of visual reference yet, nor any cloud or fog.
\"The pilot said that when he contacted ACK tower to land, he was instructed to fly about 5 miles south of nantarket to join the downwind of runway 24;
However, he maintained a distance of 3 to 4 miles because he could not see the island at 5 miles.
The pilot said he had to earn 310 when he approached the airport
The spacing degree turns.
He said that during the turn, \"I found that I could not maintain the height by external reference and had to use my [
Vertical speed indicator
VSI and HSI maintain height and coordinate turns correctly.
\"Another pilot flew from Balang, Maine, to Long Island, New York, and crossed the Long Island Strait about 1930 kilometers the same night.
The pilot said that in the FSS pre-flight weather briefing, the expert instructed the VMC for his flight.
The pilot submitted the IFR flight plan and flew at 6,000 feet.
He said he encountered 2 to 3 miles of visibility throughout the flight due to smog.
He also said the lowest visibility was on the water, between Cape Cod, Massachusetts and eastern Long Island.
He said he did not encounter any cloud under 6,000 feet.
The third pilot left TEB after a stopover in MVY and traveled about 2030 kilometers to the destination of Groton, Connecticut.
He said that after leaving, he flew south of HPN, and in the case of Class B airspace remaining awake, he climbed 7,500 feet kilometers.
He also said that on the way, he monitored several ATC frequencies, but he did not transmit on any of them until approaching MVY.
His flight route took him across the North Shore of Long Island to Montauk, New York.
He said he then crossed the Block Island in Rhode Island and went straight to MVY.
The whole flight, he said, was carried out under VFR with visibility of 3 to 5 miles in the smoke.
On land, he says, he can see the lights on the ground when he looks directly down or slightly forward;
However, he says there is no horizon for reference on the surface of the water.
He said that he was not sure if he was at the top of the smog layer at 7,500 feet M, and during the flight he did not encounter any clouds or ground fog during the climb or descent.
He also said that there is still no horizon for reference between Block Island and MVY.
He recalled that when he was near the Gay Head, he began to observe the lights at Martha\'s Vineyard.
He said he would start to drop from 7,500 feet before reaching MVY and would be between 3,000 and 5,000 feet on Gay heads (
The pilot can\'t remember his exact height).
He did not remember seeing the Gay Head Sea lighthouse.
When he first observed the rotating beacon at the airport, he was about 4 miles from MVY.
He said he had a calm landing at about 2145 MVY.
About 2200, the pilot left MVY when the controller announced that the tower was closed.
After taking off, he continued to move in the direction of 290 degrees, climbed to 6,500 feet degrees, and then went straight to Groton.
The pilot said that during the return flight, visibility was the same as the one he encountered during his flight to MVY, which was about 3 to 5 miles in the smoke.
Another CDW pilot told the news media that he canceled his planned flight from CDW to MVY the night of the accident due to \"bad\" weather.
In a written statement, he said: \"At my own discretion, visibility seems to be about 4 miles --extremely hazy.
The wind is quite light.
Based only on the current weather conditions of CDW, I was unable to get my friends to go with me, in fact I did not have to spend money in the hotel room of Martha\'s Vineyard and I decided to fly to Martha\'s Vineyard on Saturday.
\"The communication does not have a record of the pilot or the pilot using the aircraft registration number, no weather briefing has been received, and no flight plan for the accident flight has been submitted to FAA accident.
In addition, pilots or pilots using the aircraft registration number do not have access to any records of the FSS or ATC towers or facilities during the flight, except for the record of the CDW.
The mvy atc tower tape shows the period between the departure of the accident aircraft from the CDW to the closure of the tower and the closure of the recorder (about 2200)
, The call number of the pilot, N9253N or any unknown station did not try to contact.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
According to the Aviation Information Manual, an alert is issued near HPN (AIM)
, The definitions of Class B and Class D airspace are as follows: Class B airspace: \"Generally speaking, airspace from the ground to [10,000 feet MSL]mean sea level]
Around the busiest airport in the country in IFR operations or passenger placements. . .
All aircraft operating in the area require ATC clearance and all licensed aircraft can obtain separation services within the airspace. . .
Regardless of weather conditions, ATC permission is required before running within class B empty domain. . .
\"Class D airspace:\" It is generally considered that the airspace from the ground to the airport is more than 2,500 feet above sea level (charted in MSL)
There is a running control tower around these airports. . . Two-
A means of radio communication must be established with ATC facilities that provide ATC services, and then these communications are maintained in Class D airspace. . . .
\"The following TCAS alerts occur during the close proximity of commercial aircraft to HPN, which is located in the published class D airspace and the Class B airspace in New York.
On July 16, 1999, about 2049mm, flight 1484, Fox 100, landed at HPN.
According to 1484, flight and New York close to controller between the Communication record 2049: 33, flight of 1484 level for 6,000 feet level.
At 2049 point 48, flight 1484 admitted that flight 3,000 feet had instructed flight 1484 to decline and maintain.
At 2050 point 32, the controller issued an entry permit to flight 1484, which flight 1484 acknowledged.
Here is an excerpt from the communication record between flight 1484 and the controller about TCAS: 2052: 22, controller, \"14 84 traffic 1 point in the United States and 2400 miles east, unverified, as if climbing.
\"Flight 2052: 29,1484,\" We are looking for the 14 th four in the United States.
\"2052: 56, controller,\" 14 eighty-four traffic points, well, three miles, two eight hundred now, unverified.
\"Flight 2053: 02,1484,\" Well, yes, we haveunintelligible)
I think we have him in America.
\"Flight 2053: 10, 1484,\" I know he didn\'t get in touch with you or anyone else.
\"2053: 14, controller,\" Well, no, don\'t talk to anyone.
\"Flight 2053: 27,1484,\" Now we just got a traffic consultation and seem to be crossing Flight 35.
\"2053: 35, controller,\" Well, it looks like this.
\"Flight 2053: 59,1484,\" Well, we just had one.
\"2054: 12, controller,\" 14 84, USA, you can contact Tower 73.
\"Flight 2054: 15,1484,\" 19-7 well, we have a resolution suggesting that it seems like a single engine blower Commander or something.
\"2054: 21, controller,\" Roger.
\"The incident occurred outside the airspace of Class B and HPN D in New York and it was reported that no corrective action was taken by the controller or flight 1484.
The radar data associated with the unknown target and the N9253N trajectory are reviewed.
The airport information MVY is 68 feet above sea level.
Time of operation of the contract-
Operating tower from 0600 to 2200.
There are two runways in MVY.
Runway 06/24 is asphalt.
Surface, 5,500 feet long, 100 feet wide.
Runway 15/33 is asphalt.
Surface, 3,297 feet long, 75 feet wide. A VOR-
Distance measuring equipment (DME)
Navigation equipment is available at the airport.
VOR is listed as normal expected interference-
Free service at 40 nm, DME can provide up to 18,000 feet.
Il, VOR and GPS instrument methods were released for the airport.
MVY is about 10 miles east of Gay Head.
Guy Hyde has a lighthouse at 41 degrees 20 degrees for sea navigation.
9 minutes north latitude; 70 degrees, 50.
1 minute western longitude
According to US Coast Guard personnel, the top of the lighthouse is 170 feet above the average low water level and operates 24 hours a day. a-day.
Rotating beacon in 15-The second cycle, 7.
3 seconds White 7. 3 seconds red.
The expected range of white light is 24 miles, and the expected range of red light is 20 miles.
The aircraft is equipped with a flight communication Digital Recorder Clock, DVR 300i.
The device contains a digital clock that is connected to a radio communication circuit and can record conversations between aircraft and other wireless power supplies, ground or air.
The unit is activated by voice and continuous loops can record and retain data for a total of 5 minutes.
The unit has a need for 9-
The Volt backup battery holds voice data.
When the device was in the wreckage, it was crushed, the spare battery was lost and no data was kept.
Information on the wreckage on July 20, 1999, the wreckage of the aircraft wasS.
The Navy Diver of the recycling ship \"grasp\", at a depth of about 120 feet below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean.
According to divers, the recovered debris is distributed in a debris field about 120 feet long and oriented along a magnetic bearing of about 010/190 degrees.
The main cabin area was found in the middle of the debris field.
A Security Council investigator was present during the salvage operation.
On July 21, 1999, the main cabin area was lifted and placed on the \"grip number.
In July 22, 1999, divers conducted five more dives, and the remains retrieved from these dives were also placed on the \"grip.
On July 23, 1999, about 2100, the wreckage was transferred from the \"grip\" to the Security Council of a naval base in Newport, Rhode Island.
On the evening of July 23, 1999, the wreckage was transported to the US Coast Guard Air Station at Otis Air Force Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
On July 24, 25 and 1999, board investigators inspected the wreckage in a hangar at the U. S. Coast Guard Air Station. Follow-
The up exam was conducted on August 1 and 1999.
According to the report of the chairman of the airworthiness team, it was found that the engine was separated from the engine support truss.
The structural tubing on the right side of the engine support truss is missing.
The engine support truss is deformed to the right and breaks in many positions.
The upper left engine mounting ear and lower mounting ear are all broken.
Upper right engine mounting ear bending.
The engine and propeller were retained for further inspection.
About 75% of the fuselage structure is recycled.
Part of the roof at the rear of the cabin, about 5 feet long and 3 1/2 wide, separated from the fuselage;
This part includes the fuselage-
Left mounting hinge-
Left side door and part frame-Side hatch.
The left side of this section shows the accordion extrusion Damage at the rear up and contains multiple folds about 5 inch deep.
No body structure was restored from the left or right side of the cabin area, except for a piece of approximately 2 feet by 2 feet skin located below the left side
Side passenger window frame.
The belly skin and floor structure of the fuselage is intact after the wing beam box is transportedThrough the paragraph.
The recycled floor structure in front of this section is broken.
Five of the six seats were found in the fuselage.
The sixth seat was not restored.
The fuselage structure at the rear of the cabin is mostly recycled.
About 60% of right-wing structures were recovered, including the entire span of the main beam.
The right wing has been separated into multiple parts and has shown more damage than the left.
The right-wing main beam is divided into three pieces.
The wing beam broke at the connection with the main bearing --Through the paragraph.
The upper spar cap breaks to show tension at its front edge and compression at its rear edge.
In this area, the spar mesh exhibits backward bending and tearing.
The outer part of the leading edge of the wing shows damage to the backward accordion extrusion and is separated from the rest of the wing.
No evidence of bending damage to the upward spar was found.
No evidence of metal fatigue was found on any broken surface.
The entire span of the right flap is restored;
In two paragraphs (
String fracture)
Both parts are separated from the right.
The flaps are not shown, whether they are bent, bulging, or flat deformation.
About 33 inch of the right wing is recovered, and the leading edge of this part is manifested as backward extrusion deformation.
About 80% of the left wing structure was recovered, including the entire span of the main beam.
The main beam of the left wing is separated into several blocks, and the deformation is less than that of the right wing.
The wing beam breaks near the left edge of the main bearerThrough the paragraph.
The upper and lower spar caps of the region break to show tension at the forward edge and compression at the rear edge.
In this area, the spar web also exhibits backward bending and tearing.
No evidence of bending damage to the upward spar was found.
No evidence of metal fatigue was found on any broken surface.
Restored about 90% of the upper and lower wing skin between the main wing and the rear wing.
The upper skin near the left tip was razed to the ground.
The leading edge skin of the left wing inside close to the stall warning Port shows damage consistent with the fluid dynamics deformation in the back direction. A 27-
The inside part of the inch of the wing flap part is restored, and the leading edge of the part shows a post-accordion extrusion Damage.
No bending, bulging or plane deformation occurred in the flap part.
Restored the entire span of the left wing;
It is divided into two pieces.
The outer part of the wing curls down.
The vertical stabilizer and rudder are separated from the rear fuselage.
The stabilizer is separated from the rear fuselage connection point and divided into five pieces.
Two of them are composed of left and right lateral parts, about 22 inch long, showing a semi-circular symmetrical post-extrusion trace with a diameter of about 5 inch.
The fracture surface of the left lateral part shows tear in the rear direction.
The fracture surface of the lateral part of the right side presents a forward and upward tear.
The left inner part of the stabilizer is more complete than the right inner part.
The leading edge of the right stabilizer part exhibits backward uniform extrusion damage along its entire leading edge.
The lower part of the rudder is separated from the vertical anti-roll fin structure and remains attached to the torque tube bellcrank assembly and the rear beam fin.
The rudder folds to the right side of the plane.
The vertical stabilizer is also twisted, bent, and curled to the right.
The structure around the dorsal fin is symmetrically deformed upwards.
All three landing gear assemblies are separated from the fuselage and recycled.
The retracement/extension drive cylinder associated with the front gear and the left main gear was found in the fully retracted position.
The retraction/extension drive cylinder of the right main gear is not restored.
The inspection of the aileron control cable circuit and related hardware found no prior evidence of blockage or failure.
The flight control cable continuity of the entire right aileron control circuit is established, including the entire balance cable connecting the right aileron to the left aileron.
The control cable continuity of the left aileron cannot be established due to impact damage and breakage.
All ends of the aileron control cable circuit separation have evidence of tensile overload.
Check the stop point of the wing;
No evidence of serious repeated strike marks or deformation was found.
The inspection of the stabilizer control cable circuit and related hardware found no prior evidence of blockage or failure.
The flight control cable continuity of the stability device is established from the control surface to the cockpit control device.
The stabilizer balance weight is separated from the stabilizer, and the fracture associated with the separation is consistent with the tensile overload.
Check the stop of the stabilizer;
No evidence of serious repeated strike marks or deformation was found.
The inspection of the stabilizer trim control cable circuit and related hardware found no prior evidence of blockage or failure.
From the control surface to the cockpit area, the control cable circuit for the decoration of the stability device is established.
The inspection of the stabilizer decorative barrel self-tapping screw shows that the upper part of the shell of the decorative barrel assembly highlights a complete thread.
The barrel assembly can rotate freely and wrap the decorative control cable around it.
The two cable ends are about 41 inch and 37 inch separate from the barrel assembly winding, respectively.
The examination of the isolates showed evidence consistent with the tensile overload.
The inspection of the rudder control cable circuit and related hardware found no prior evidence of blockage or failure.
The flight control cable continuity of the rudder is established from the control surface to the cockpit controller.
Check the stop point of the rudder;
No evidence of serious repeated strike marks or deformation was found.
The executive mechanism of the self-tapping screw of the electric wing is not recovered.
The flap switch in the cockpit is broken.
Throttle and propeller controls in complete-
Forward position.
The mixture control was broken.
Alternating air control was found in the closed position.
The key in the magnetic switch was found in both positions.
The tachometer needle is intact, fixed in place and points to 2,750 rpm.
The red line on the tachometer starts from 2,700.
The hourly register read 0663 in the tachometer. 5 hours.
It is found that the manifold pressure meter needle is fixed in the appropriate position and 27 inch Hg is displayed.
It was found that the fuel flow meter needle was slightly loose and showed 22 gallons per hour.
It is found that the exhaust gas thermometer needle is loose and shows 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit (F).
It was found that the oil temperature table was fixed and expressed as 150 degrees Fahrenheit.
It is found that the oil pressure gauge is fixed, indicating about 17 pounds per square inch (psi).
The cylinder temperature needle was not found.
The fuel scale was destroyed.
It was found that the height gauge needle was fixed and displayed at 270 feet.
It is found that the height table setting is fixed at 30. 09 Hg.
At 097-found the top of the VOR indicator header carddegree bearing.
Inspection of all recovered wires and components did not find any evidence of Arc or fire.
The circuit breaker panel is deformed and the impact is damaged.
All circuit breakers are in trip position except flaps, transceivers and DME.
A circuit breaker that provides protection for the transponder is also found to trip, which provides VFR codes and height readings for radar facilities below 1,100 feet.
The fuel selector valve was recovered and the bottom of the valve was missing.
All three fuel lines are broken.
The valve is separated from the fuselage connection point.
The selector valve connecting rod is deformed and the valve is found in the closed position.
A liquid with a low color, smell and texture of 100
Lead aviation gasoline was found in the fuel selection valve oil bottom shell.
When applying power to an electrically driven fuel booster pump, it is able to work.
There are six seats on the plane.
Seats are arranged according to the \"club style\" arrangement with two strikers
1 row facing seats (
Including the pilot\'s seat), two aft-
2 rows facing seats, the first two rows-
3 rows facing seats.
The five recycled seats are separated from the floor structure.
Check the aluminum back of the two rear
The seat facing shows that they are deformed (bulged)
In the direction of progress.
Front seats left and right with seat belts and shoulder straps.
The seat belts of these seats cannot be found in the wreckage.
Four seats in the second and third rows are also equipped with seat belts and shoulder straps.
Two parts of the seat belt on the leftside aft-
Evidence of stretching was found and shown.
Inside part of the right leg strap-side aft-
The second row of seat facing seats has been cut about 3 inch cleanly from men
The end of the latch and the outside part of the seat belt of this seat show evidence of stretching.
All the seat belt parts of the third row seat were identified and none of them showed evidence of stretching.
Shoulder seat belts in the back seat cannot be identified in the wreckage.
On July 21, 1999, the doctor conducted a physical examination and pathological information on the pilots and passengers.
James Weiner, chief forensic office of the Massachusetts Federation.
The results showed that the pilots and passengers were killed by multiple injuries due to aircraft accidents.
The FAA toxicology Accident Research Laboratory conducted a toxicology test.
Toxicity tests for alcohol and substance abuse were negative.
Medical data according to medical records, on June 1, 1999, the pilot broke his left ankle in a \"hanging taxi\" accident. on June 2, 1999, he underwent an operation \"open reduction and internal fixation\" for fracture of his left ankle \".
On June 23, 1999, the pilot\'s leg was removed from the casting and placed in the \"Cam\"Walker.
Cam of the pilot, July 15, 1999-
Walker was removed and in July 16, 1999 he was given a \"straight cane\" and was instructed to use the cane.
Medical records show that the pilot is \"complete\"
A heavy load of slightly painful gait.
\"In the interview, the physical therapist of the pilot said that the pilot did not fully bend (
Bend the feet up)
He was unable to determine whether the pilot\'s gait was caused by his slight movement limitation or mild pain.
The pilot\'s plastic surgeon said he felt that in the event of an accident, the pilot could have used the left foot to apply the type of pressure normally required for an emergency braking application, with the right foot in the car.
According to Section 61 of 14 CFR.
53, \"Surgery is prohibited during medical defects\", in surgery that requires medical certificate, no one may act as a pilotin-
When the man ordered ,\"(1)
Knowing or having reason to know any medical condition that would make the person unable to meet the medical certification requirements required for the pilot procedure.
According to a FAA doctor, the accident pilot\'s ankle injury type pilot at the time of the accident usually does not visit and obtain approval from the FAA forensic doctor before resuming flight activities.
Test and study engine and propeller check July 26, 1999, engine in Textron-
Lycoming facility in William Sport, Pennsylvania, under the supervision of the safety board power plant investigator.
On July 28, 1999, under the supervision of the safety board power plant investigator, the propeller hub and blade were inspected at the Hartzell Propeller facility in PICU, Ohio.
During both reviews, all parties to the investigation were present.
According to the fact report of the chairman of the power plant group, the inspection of the engine and propeller did not find any evidence that any previous faults or circumstances would prevent the engine from operating.
The report also said, \"the investigation team found the impact marks on the propeller blades and the top of the engine, there were witness marks on the inside of the propeller, and the engine control and instrument in the cockpit showed that the engine power output was high.
\"The self-driving operating aircraft is equipped with the Bendix/King 150 Series automatic flight control system (AFCS)
Approved for Piper PA-32R-
On November 1, 1982, the FAA released a model of 301 aircraft.
AFCS offers two
Shaft control for vertical and horizontal rolling.
It also has an electric pitch system that provides automatic pitch during self-driving operation and manual electric pitch for pilots during manual operation.
The AFCS installed on the accident aircraft have a height holding mode, which allows the aircraft to maintain the height when the selection height is maintained.
AFCS do not have the option to allow the pilot to pre-select the height, so that the autopilot can fly and keep the pre-selected height as it climbs or drops from another height.
AFCS installed a vertical trim rocker switch so that the pilot can change the height of the aircraft up and down with the autopilot constantly on.
The rocker switch allows the pilot to make a small correction at the selected height in height holding mode, or allows the pitch attitude to be adjusted at a rate of about 0.
9 degrees per second when not in height holding mode.
AFCS incorporates a flight director who must activate it before the autopilot engages.
Once launched, the director of flight can provide the command to the flight command indicator to maintain the wing level and pitch attitude.
To satisfy the command, the pilot can fly the aircraft manually by referring to the guidance received in the flight command indicator, or the pilot can manipulate the aircraft in a similar way through the autopilot servo system to make it satisfy the command.
The AFCS combines a navigation mode that can provide guidance for pilots or autopilot on intercepting and tracking VOR and GPS courses.
When in this mode, the AFCS can receive input signals from the selected VOR frequency and course, or from the GPS course data displayed on the image navigation indicator.
The flight command indicator can then command the bank to use automatic side wind compensation to maintain the selected VOR or GPS route, which the autopilot will satisfy if the autopilot engages.
The AFCS combines the title selection mode, allowing the pilot to select the title by moving the \"bug\" on the outer ring of the picture navigation indicator.
Once the bug is moved to the desired title and the title selection button is engaged, the autopilot can command the aircraft to reach the title at a tilt angle of about 22 degrees.
AFCS has a steering wheel (CWS)
The button installed on the control bracket allows the pilot to manipulate the aircraft without leaving the autopilot.
According to AlliedSignal, when the CWS button is released, the autopilot will restore control over the aircraft for the course and height selected when the CWS button is released.
According to FAA and Bendix/King, the design of the decoration system can withstand any single
Flight failure
In the cockpit, the decoration fault was declared visually and audibly.
By using a monitoring circuit, the aircraft control will automatically return to the pilot when a fault is detected.
After testing AFCS before flight, it can be manually or automatically connected and detached.
The following conditions will result in automatic autopilot detachment: Power failure, internal flight control system failure, loss of effective compass signal, roll rate of more than 14 degrees per second, tones of more than 8 degrees per second.
Aviation electronic equipment inspection on July 29 and 1999, under the supervision of the Security Council investigator, the aviation electronic equipment was inspected at the joint signal/King radio facility in olasi, Kansas.
October 13 and 14, 1999
Under the supervision of the Security Board investigator, the navigation and communication transceiver and all three autopilot servo systems were inspected.
During both reviews, all parties to the investigation were present.
The AFCS of the accident aircraft were inspected.
Inspection and functional testing of AFCS asphalt, asphalt trim and roll servo systems did not find any evidence of pre-impact failure or blockage.
The accident plane is equipped with a GPS receiver, the Bendix/King model KLN-90B.
GPS can display mobile maps;
Orientation and distance to programmable destinations such as airports and destinations;
Airport information; ground speed;
And other information.
GPS is also able to connect with AFCS and image navigation indicators.
The inspection of the GPS device shows that it is crushed vertically.
The display on the front of the unit was destroyed.
The ON/OFF switch was found in the ON position.
The navigation database shows that the database came into effect on October 8, 1998 and expires on November 4, 1998.
The wire connecting the circuit of 3. 6-
Separate the volt lithium battery.
According to AlliedSignal, the lithium battery provides power to retain the non-volatile memory of the GPS receiver and requires at least 2.
5 v keep memory.
The measured battery voltage is 0.
2 volts and make sure the memory is not kept.
Bendix/King KR exam-
87, automatic direction finder, showing that the frequency of the receiver is set to 400 kHz (kHz)
The secondary frequency is set to 200 kHz.
The communication/navigation transceiver of the aircraft has been severely damaged and cannot be powered on.
Extract the non-volatile storage circuit chip from the transceiver, put it into the test unit and power it on.
For each transceiver, note the following information: transceiver number1, KX-165 The in-
Set to 132 using communication frequency.
02, the same frequency as the TEB A
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